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Axel Honneth’s (2017) The Idea of Socialism is a timely reflection on a 
puzzling state of affairs: Perhaps at no time in the past several decades 
have so many sensed that there is something terribly wrong with global 
capitalism – from mounting inequalities to runaway climate change – 
and yet rarely has the resolve to think through workable alternatives to 
the global capitalist order been weaker. But the “sudden decline in 
utopian energy” (p. 2), or withering away of the millenarian impulse, is 
perhaps not so difficult to explain. As Honneth recognizes, it is incredibly 
hard to re-engineer vastly complex, mutually interdependent systems of 
political governance, economic production, and sociocultural 
reproduction – perhaps so difficult that the very idea of fashioning 
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ideological blueprints for the refabricating of the world has itself grown 
outmoded. 
Honneth’s favored explanation for this frustrating situation is the 
role of reification, the idea that social facts now appear more strongly 
than ever before as naturalized “givens”, seemingly immune to the 
ameliorative efforts of social movements (pp. 4-5). As Fred Jameson 
(2003: 76) is fond of pointing out, “It is easier to imagine the end of the 
world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” (In a perspicacious 
comment on technofuturism, van Valkenburgh (2017: 4) notes that 
technological optimists find it easier to imagine capitalism's 
transcendence of human nature (through technological augmentation) 
than humanity's capacity to transcend capitalism (through collective 
action).) But Honneth fails to seriously consider another alternative: that 
previous generations of socialist reformers and revolutionaries were 
blind to the complexities of the tasks that lay before them, and that social 
reality has become increasingly complex in line with the increasing 
interdependence of social reality. Past utopians were simply ignorant of 
the objective difficulties facing them, and those difficulties have only 
increased. 
Axel Honneth is one of the world's leading thinkers in the Critical 
Theory tradition, a protégé of Jürgen Habermas, and a professor of 
philosophy in Frankfurt and at Columbia. It is well worth paying attention, 
then, to what this influential thinker has to say about socialism. I want to 
challenge Honneth’s account on five central points. Briefly, these points 
can be summarized as follows. First, Honneth glosses over socialism’s 
sacrifice of individual liberty on the altar of collectivism. Subordinating 
individual liberty to social solidarity, as Honneth’s concept of “social 
freedom” presupposes, seems inevitably to involve displeasure and 
opposition among sizeable segments of the population. How will 
socialism bring these naysayers onboard? Second, Honneth claims the 
early socialists were insufficiently attuned to the “functional 
differentiation” of society. But Honneth commits a category error: they 
were revolutionaries, not sociologists, and their images of society were 
simultaneously attempts to make those images real. Third, even if the 
early socialists were wrong on multiple points – why shouldn’t their views 
be at least partly invalidated by two centuries of rupture and revolution? – 
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this need not detain us. We can and should move beyond the exegesis of 
socialism’s Founding Fathers, from Saint-Simon to Marx and beyond. 
Fourth, Honneth suggests abandoning the “nation-state” and 
experimenting with a sort of anarchist localism in its place. But Honneth 
doesn’t stop to consider how the potentially cataclysmic catastrophes 
confronting humanity today are to be resolved by spontaneous, post-
statist entities. Finally, the concept of social freedom is allusive and 
sketch-like in this book. 
 Whatever the reasons for why socialism has foundered, Honneth’s 
aim is to rejuvenate it. To this end, he draws on a long tradition of “early” 
or “classical” socialist thinking, primarily from the first half of the 
nineteenth century, from Saint-Simon and Fourier through Robert Owen 
to Karl Marx and beyond. Honneth primarily thinks of socialism as a 
movement seeking to reconcile a contradictory aim emanating from the 
French Revolution: that of harmonizing liberty and fraternity. Freedom 
has, of course, been the watchword of Western liberal democracy for 
over two centuries, but it has been freedom largely conceived in 
contractual, individualistic terms – Isaiah Berlin’s notion of negative 
freedom. 
Fraternity, on the other hand, has received less attention. (Honneth 
never once stops to consider the gender-specific implications of 
fraternus, "of or belonging to a brother," despite his later criticism of early 
socialism for failing to consider feminist concerns. Unlike the early 
socialists, who viewed socialism as little more than the “desire for a more 
just distribution of resources” (p. 10), socialism has always revolved 
around a series of essentially “moral or ethical intentions” (p. 10), 
whatever the Marxists might have to say about such matters (and they’ve 
largely disparaged the idea that Marxism is at heart an ethical project). 
As Oscar Wilde observed in his classical essay on socialism, “Under 
socialism…there will be no people living in fetid dens and fetid rags, and 
bringing up unhealthy hunger-pinched children in the midst of 
impossible and absolutely repulsive surroundings” (Wilde 2001 [1891]: 
128). For all of the Marxian bluster about “utopian socialism” (e.g. Marx 
and Engels 2008 [1848]: 77-80), socialist thought has continuously been 
nourished by a Wildean rage. And this rage, one might plausibly claim, 
has aimed at raising the general level of “fraternity” in society. Fraternity 
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means “mutual responsibility in solidarity” (p. 12), a way of socializing 
desire, while freedom has in the Western tradition largely been reduced 
to the “pursuit of purely private interest” (p. 12). Fraternity means 
recognizing the suffering of others and incorporating it into one’s own 
being. 
How to reconcile these aims? Honneth is enough of a Hegelian to 
recall the observation in the Philosophy of Right that liberty expressly 
does not mean the “freedom to do as we please.” As one of Hegel’s 
Zusätse has it, “Talk of this kind is due to wholly uneducated, crude, and 
superficial ideas” (Hegel 2008: 301-302). Rather, true freedom, on the 
Hegelian account, involves a certain orientation toward the world and a 
particular mode of action embedded in collective aims, shaped and 
enabled by thick webs of collectivism, or “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit). 
Honneth describes this as social freedom. Without a strongly developed 
concept of social freedom, that is, if “liberty is not interpreted in a less 
individualistic and more intersubjective manner” (p. 13) – which is the 
theoretical premise for a future reconciliation of the tripartite normative 
foundation of socialism, i.e. liberty, equality, and fraternity – socialism will 
continue to founder. Solidarity is just another word for social freedom, 
which is just a roundabout way of saying love, in Honneth’s reading of 
Marx: unlike in a society obeying the logic of Adam Smith’s political 
vision, where “each member is only a ‘merchant’ for the other” (p. 16), 
socialism means forging loving relationships of mutual solidarity. “Just as 
in love, my activities must both serve my own self-realization,” Honneth 
writes, “as well as that of my partners in interaction” (p. 18). Socialism is 
love by another name. 
Without love, solidarity, or sociality, our individual aims and desires 
will sooner or later come crashing up against the interests of wider 
collectives, for a solidarous subjectivity entails self-adjusting preference 
sets, so that one’s desires do not exceed the constraints given by an 
embedded economy. But this is precisely what makes socialism both 
attractive and unattractive. Honneth never really addresses this central 
challenge, pulsating at the core of socialism. As Plato’s Republic makes 
clear, the purpose of Socrates’s ideal society is not “to make anyone 
group outstandingly happy but to make the whole city so, as far as 
possible” (Plato 1997: 1053). Socialism’s aim of “making the whole city 
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happy” inevitably entails the reduction of misery at the cost of reducing 
exuberant joys. It simply isn’t possible to produce, in Honneth’s words, a 
“social form of life in which individual freedom thrives not at the cost of 
solidarity, but with its help” (p. 107). Solidarity must necessarily trump 
individual freedom, often in quite deliberate, constrictive ways. Honneth 
wants to be a good Hegelian proponent of Sittlichkeit, solidarity, and 
what he terms “social freedom,” while still clinging to the liberal valuation 
of negative freedom. 
But while many will probably be quite happy to soak the rich if it 
entails housing, feeding, and clothing the homeless, how far are they 
willing to go in sacrificing comfortable lifestyles – traveling on cross-
continental vacations, say, or buying expensive consumer gadgets, or 
acquiring a holiday home – for the sake of helping the poor and the 
downtrodden? How can socialism address the twinge of anxiety felt by 
the contented classes in postindustrialized societies at the prospect of 
lifting the field by lowering the ceiling? “The point of departure of the 
socialist movement is the holistic notion that the community of solidarity, 
rather than the individual, is the bearer of freedom,” writes Honneth (p. 
25), glossing over the difficulties of making such a position saleable to 
capitalism’s winners, of whom there are quite a few in postindustrialized 
nations. Indeed, the idea of the intertwining of community and individual, 
the adjustment of the individual desire for personal to societal ambitions, 
are what make socialism both so easy and so difficult to attack. 
Difficult, because, as Honneth points out, appeals to the collective 
good, to fraternity and even equality, have always been an integral part of 
the liberal creed, however obtusely formulated: Adam Smith’s baker, 
butcher, and brewer are said to promote the collective good by self-
interested action. No ideology can survive long without convincing its 
addressees that it is capable of producing sound and stable modes of 
collective existence (p. 25). Easy, because all of this sounds vaguely 
ominous: the Hoover Institution would have a field day with the 
totalitarian undertones of the concept of “social freedom,” which could 
easily be construed as a contradiction in terms. 
Here I think we are approaching one of the signal defects of 
Honneth’s book. For if all ideologies promise to deliver up the secular 
trinity of the French Revolution, why bother with socialism at all? What is 
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the special appeal of socialism, and how does it mark a distinct position 
against competing paradigms? Honneth doesn’t offer much of an 
answer. Perhaps this stems from Honneth’s somewhat slipshod usage of 
the book’s central term, which covers all major ideological positions 
extending from reformist social democracy to revolutionary communism 
and left libertarianism. In one telling passage, Honneth flits between 
socialism and communism, noting that both “socialist and communist 
utopias…electrified their addressees with visions of a better form of life” 
(p. 4). 
Differently put, why socialism and not communism? Why not The 
Idea of Communism instead of The Idea of Socialism (besides the fact 
that the former title has already been taken by Žižek, Badiou, et al.)? As 
Žižek pointedly remarks, socialism is no longer an idea that differentiates, 
in the sense of marking difference or staking out a distinct ideological 
space. It does not set one apart from the Martin Schultzes and George 
Soroses of the world. “Everyone can be a socialist today, even Bill Gates: 
it suffices to profess the need for some kind of harmonious social unity, 
for a common good and for the care of the poor and downtrodden,” 
Žižek (2015) writes; consequently, the only properly leftist millenarian 
project is to be found in communism, Žižek claims. Today, everyone to 
the left of (and including) Steve Bannon is more or less a socialist, 
desirous of a future in which the state is mobilized to rein in markets and 
embed capitalism in a vaguely “socialized” framework. There is nothing 
distinctively radical, utopian, or anti-capitalist about socialism. Being a 
good socialist effectively means taking on the mantle of a postwar social 
democrat, a proponent of Swedish welfare capitalism, an FDR-style New 
Dealer. 
When an author unremittingly repeats the same point, again and 
again, we have hit upon a traumatic point, or at least a structural 
weakness in the architecture of their thought. Repetition is one way to 
obfuscate argumentative vacuity. In The Idea of Socialism, Honneth 
repeats in an almost astonishing number of ways the claim that 
traditional socialism failed to take into account non-economic processes 
and remained trapped in economic determinism (that old anti-Marxian 
slur: that base precedes superstructure) – that classical or early or 
traditional socialism “denied any functional differentiation” and thought of 
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“society as an entity determined entirely by the economic sphere” (p. 95). 
Honneth derives all sorts of supposed deficiencies in socialist thought 
and strategy from this alleged failure, including the inability of the Marxist 
left to take women’s rights seriously and a proclivity for economic 
determinism. I think this is a rather sloppy reading of the traditional 
socialist canon, but I won’t spend a great deal of time laboring the point, 
because I think it is beside the point. More importantly, why does it 
matter today that there were inadequacies at the core of the traditional 
socialist project? We can make our own way in the world. We need not 
feel ourselves hemmed in by the limitations of classical, traditional, or 
early socialism. We should forge ahead. 
In almost comically academicist fashion, Honneth misunderstands 
what socialism in its essence was and perhaps continues to be. 
Socialism was and is not a sociological or analytical theory destined for 
the hands of professional social scientists. It has always been above all a 
theory of revolutionary practice, which means a theory aimed at 
subverting society rather than representing or portraying it. Its aim has 
been to transform and revolutionize, a fundamental insight Honneth, 
despite his erudition, appears to have forgotten. Early socialism tried to 
exert what Bourdieu calls a theory effect (Bourdieu 1989: 17), an attempt 
to change the facts on the ground, to impose a new way of seeing that 
would recast the world according to the beholder’s desires. The point 
was, as Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach has it, to change the world, 
not interpret it. 
This has been a recurrent misunderstanding of Marx in the social 
sciences, where Marx has been recast as a sort of proto-sociologist. This 
portrayal is largely a figment of the twentieth-century scholastic 
imagination, an attempt to incorporate the old master into the 
sociological canon, and thereby appropriate him, without having to deal 
with the essentially threatening implications of his work. And yet Marx 
was never a completist in matters of social analysis – he certainly made 
no claims to comprehensive analysis – and he clearly ignored or under-
analyzed many issues that would be of relevance to contemporary 
sociologists, from the family to the prison system to cultural production. 
This doesn’t mean Marx or Engels didn’t write something about most of 
these issues. (Memorably, on crime, Marx writes that the purpose of 
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crime is to produce the whole apparatus of the criminal law, courts, 
judges, and prisons – a perfect Hegelian inversion of the common-sense 
view that these arise to combat crime; rather, crime arises to combat 
them, a sort of Yakov Smirnoff joke.) And Marx’s articles in the New York 
Tribune (e.g. Marx 2007) are a testament to the spuriousness of the 
charge that the two leading figures of early socialism were brute 
reductionists – why else bother to expend considerable analytical 
firepower to understand the political contingencies of the day? As 
Wacquant (1985) has shown, Marx did not remain restricted to a base-
superstructure model, but was sophisticated enough to appreciate the 
“organic totality” of social reality. 
Marx was not a sociologist because sociology did not yet exist in 
the mid-nineteenth century. The idea that a model of society largely left 
unresolved such areas as the family and civil society is only problematic 
in so far as that model is not above all else an attempt to transform 
society rather than catalogue society, i.e. produce comprehensive 
accounts of social life. Honneth seems to forget what traditional 
socialism turned on, committing the category error of reading early 
socialism as a sort of nascent sociology. Of course, the scholastic gaze 
tends to reduce all issues to scholastic issues, as Bourdieu (1990) 
reminds us. Honneth’s view of early socialism is certainly tinted by a vita 
contemplativa: anyone who has led a vita activa, a life of political 
struggle, would probably prohibit themselves from producing such 
arguments. This isn’t to romanticize activism and denigrate academe. 
We need both. Still, it’s worth bearing in mind how the material 
conditions of production shape the products of the academic process of 
production. It it tempting to ask: what did Honneth ever do to make the 
world a little more socialist – besides writing books? 
It is so important to Honneth that early socialism allegedly failed to 
take into account the “functional differentiation” of society – Honneth 
sounds like a Parsonian structural functionalist in this register – because 
he ascribes the failure of socialism to an inability to take functional 
differentiation into account. Socialism was a product of the Industrial 
Revolution, Honneth notes, and therefore it could not think outside the 
terms imposed by industry: it could not get beyond economy, because it 
was itself a reactive ideology, a reaction to industrialization and 
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economic dislocations. If socialism is to work in the late-modern or 
advanced capitalist age, so the argument goes, it must be able to figure 
out what to do about all of these socially differentiated functions. (One 
thing sociology cannot be faulted for over these past 20 years is its 
proliferation of terms and metaphors meant to capture functional 
differentiation: systems, fields, bubbles, spheres, and so on.) Socialism 
“must be able to say something about how the different spheres of social 
freedom are to harmonize with each other in the future” (p. 90). In other 
words, socialism needs a coordinating agency or framework, something 
that can manage the “interplay among the various spheres of social 
freedom” (p. 94).  
The standard assumption is that this coordinating agency must be 
the state, or “the nation-state” (p. 94), as Honneth glosses it. In its place, 
Honneth flirts with spontaneism, with anarchist organicism, federal 
arrangements, councils, communes, and localism. Honneth thinks the 
age of the nation-state has passed, because of “transnationalization,” 
which means the weakening of the nation-state following climate 
change, capital mobility, and other processes of planetization. How all of 
this is supposed to work remains unclear, which is perhaps to be 
expected from a compact, hundred-page-long book, originally delivered 
as a public lecture series.  
Still, there are good reasons to be wary of abandoning the nation-
state. If the social fact of transnationality has made the nation-state 
superfluous, why should we expect a lower level of social organization, a 
regional or local council federation – consisting of fewer people, less 
money, and less power – to be able to make itself relevant? Brexit 
teaches an important lesson in this regard: one of the first things Prime 
Minister Theresa May did after triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
initiating withdrawal proceedings from the European Union, was to travel 
to Saudi Arabia to hold trade talks with the kingdom’s Wahhabite regime 
(Asthana 2017); a lowered concentration of power entailed less, not 
more, morally sound decision-making. Whereas a large regional 
superpower was able to, in part at least, refuse concessions to a 
reactionary regime, a smaller concentration of power in a single nation-
state compelled the latter to give such concessions, precisely because of 
its reduced capacity on the world’s economic-political circuit. What holds 
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true for smaller nations will also a fortiori hold true for smaller regional 
players.  
In this vein, Žižek’s (2017) plea for a “bureaucratic socialism” can 
be viewed as a rejoinder to Honneth’s intimations of the virtues of 
mutualist localism. Perhaps the scale of our challenges has instead 
become so great that we now need hyperconcentrated megastates, 
capable of allocating social energy at a sufficiently large scale, rather 
than devolved microcouncils. Rather than an abandonment of the 
nation-state tout court, William Mitchell and Thomas Fazi (2017) claim, 
what we need more than ever today is a reclamation of the state, 
because only an entity of the magnitude of the state can tackle the major 
calamities facing humanity in our present situation. 
It is perhaps telling that one of the few concrete suggestions for 
leftist political agitation to cross Honneth’s field of analysis includes Erik 
Olin Wright’s (2010) call for the construction of “real utopias,” which 
includes Wikipedia, the Mondragon Corporation, and Canadian unions’ 
attempts to engage in ethical investment practices through “solidarity 
funds.” All of these proposals, writes Honneth, are “committed to the spirit 
of experimental socialism” (p. 71). But these ideas are hardly capable of 
bringing us beyond capitalism. On the contrary, Wikipedia, founded by a 
right-wing libertarian, has been resoundingly critiqued for its Hayekian 
epistemology (Mirowski 2009). In some sense, Wikipedia is the perfect 
knowledge supplement to the capitalist digital economy, a source of 
public-domain information readily exploitable by megacorporations like 
Google, serving to exploit the free labor of the writing and thinking public 
– a kind of social dumping on the World Wide Web. Furthermore, one of 
the world’s largest Sovereign Wealth Funds, that of Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), with revenues sourced from 
ecologically devastating hydrocarbon production, has used its “ethics 
council” to convince the public that a clean, responsible form of 
shareholder capitalism is possible (Shammas 2012). And the Mondragon 
Corporation is fine for what it is, but it is a limited and self-limiting case, 
serving not as a model for the transformation of capitalism but as a 
vehicle for the promotion of post-Fordism (Kasmir 1999). These are 
“reformist reforms,” not revolutionary reforms, to use André Gorz’s 
conceptual couplet, that is, palliative treatments that expressly do not 
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push us towards a “radical transformation of society” (Gorz 1987 [1967]: 
102). 
Finally, the concept of “social freedom,” which Honneth repeatedly 
returns to in this book, remains underdeveloped. It hinges on certain 
transhistorical standards of human flourishing, dignity, and justice, 
standards which must necessarily therefore be divorced from the 
historical particularities of symbolic struggles whose aim is to construct 
and impose definite conceptions of justice, dignity, and human welfare. 
The concept presupposes a God’s-eye-view: an impossible view from 
everywhere and nowhere. It requires a firm foundation from which to 
posit particular standards of human life, which entails an impossibility, 
because this foundation must itself be posited and willed into being, 
thereby raising the spectral issue of what foundation do the 
foundationalists – the positers of social foundations – stand on? This is 
surely an impossible, intolerable situation, but it is perhaps emblematic of 
where the Frankfurt School stands today: a sort of humanist essentialism 
and (reflexive) foundationalism seem to reign supreme. Incidentally, 
Rahel Jaeggi, one of Honneth’s students, is committed to a similar 
theoretical position in an attempt to rescue Marx’s concept of alienation 
in a book that never resolves the concept’s fundamental problem (see 
Jaeggi 2014): for an individual to be alienated, they must be alienated 
from something, which means an essential human core. But who will 
define this core? On what grounds?  
Similarly, to be committed to social freedom seems to demand 
establishing principles that must at once be posited, at once be 
universally valid. “Social freedom…means taking part in the social life of a 
community whose members are so sympathetic to each other that they 
support the realization of each other's justified needs for each other's 
sake” (p. 24), writes Honneth, but all the tricks of a quasi-Rawlsian-
Habermasian philosophy are contained in that seemingly innocuous 
phrase, “justified needs.” For what are justified needs? What I tell you 
three times is true, wrote Lewis Carroll, and much the same could be 
said of justified needs: justified is that which dominant groups impose as 
justified. Perhaps the best antidote to the Honnethian vision of socialism 
as necessarily entailing human flourishing because it would involve a 
new politics and a new sociability, a new way of engaging with one’s 
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fellow beings, remains Bourdieu’s political sociology, his vision of the 
universality of struggle, of conflict, and symbolic power, meaning the 
imposition of definite categories and conceptions of reality. If all of social 
reality is premised on agonism, as Bourdieu holds, that is, that ceaseless 
struggles over symbolic power constitute the paradoxical 
antifoundational foundation of social reality, then even the economic 
equitability produced within socialism will remain riddled with 
domination. No amount of experimentation with antihierarchical 
organizational forms will rid the social realm of the specter of domination. 
Whatever lessening of domination we can hope to achieve, Bourdieu 
suggests, will be the contingent result of social struggles, not armchair 
theorizing. 
Perhaps therein lies a pragmatic lesson, that socialism’s best shot 
at coherence lies in it being premised on an arbitrarily posited series of 
absences: perhaps the ridding of the world of Beveridge’s (1942: 6) five 
“giants on the road of reconstruction” – “Want…Disease, Ignorance, 
Squalor, and Idleness” – are as solid a foundation for a future society as 
we can hope for, a sort of negative catechism, and the rest must be 
struggle. Perhaps theorizing in the spirit of positivity is where socialism 
has foundered in the past – and continues to go wrong now. Maybe 
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